Edited Event podcast

The main ideas from this information are: - The panel compliments the excellent report published recently and discusses the future of Congress. - They are interested in the Chinese party Congress and its outcome, particularly in relation to the future of China and its leadership. - They discuss the economy, domestic situation, and foreign policy of China. - They believe that China will continue to compete with India and try to diminish its influence. - They talk about the institutionalization and democratic norms within the Chinese Communist Party. - They question Xi Jinping's consolidation of power and the possibility of inward totalitarianism. - They discuss poverty eradication in China and the definition of poverty. - They mention the challenges and problems within the Chinese Communist Party. - They discuss the character of China as a state and an institution. - They mention the future leadership and potential dissent against Xi Jinping. Thank you. I think, Dr. Spangler, you may kick it off. Thank you. Let me at the outset compliment Ericka and Orca for this excellent panel here, where in graphically we need more voices on China, please. And again, start complimenting the excellent report you have published recently, which is incredibly refreshing. Again, I think Rahul is here. I found your report excellent, and I think everyone in this room, particularly in Delhi Circuit, should start with that report. It is pointed, objective, and clear. And I think this report gives us a guidance for the future of Congress. But I'm here more as a listener to Professor Deepak Vivek, who has been an outstanding scholar in terms of following the Chinese domestic politics. I have high regards for him as a psychologist. Also, wonderful to speak here, the White China Circuit from Delhi. I have my senior colleagues, colleagues with whom I have worked here for over 20 years, immensely benefited by their knowledge, their critique, their scholarship. So whatever I'm sharing with you today, partly goes to you. Let's start the debate in terms of a kind of plain analysis, where do we stand today as far as India is concerned, as far as observing China from sitting in India is concerned. The first point of the breadth of questions for Professor Deepak, how do you read the Chinese party Congress next week, and what's your plain thinking in terms of the outcome of the party Congress, in terms of the future of the party, future of the leadership, and future of China itself. Thank you, Dr. Panda. I think at the outset, I would also like to thank the young team of workers who are doing a brilliant job. In fact, I would also like to thank the workers who have produced the key points shared with me. Excellent, keep it up. And also thanks to all the non-faces in the audience, and also the new ones. I'm happy to interact with them maybe after this session, and through emails and other social media as well. Well, as far as my reading of the 20th party Congress is concerned, the outcome especially, when you are thinking about those, since our task has been cut out already by the Vichy Da, flagging out four main points, going into party Congress, then the economy, the domestic situation in China, the foreign policy, and finally a little bit about how it will impact India. To use, you know, 16 Chinese characters, as far as the outcome is concerned, I would say it would be reminiscent, so that is people's leaders, the first, reminiscent people's economy, second, 大国外交, great power diplomacy, and finally, as far as India is concerned, I think it is going to be the same, 小韩印度, which I say China will continue to build to India. Now, as far as the first thing is concerned, I think as it has been the case with other party Congresses, it will take stock of the last five years and then draw a blueprint for the next five years, that is the 21st party Congress. And I think, you know, in Chinese it will be 举什么旗, 举什么路线, you know, which banner to hold and which general bottom line to follow. It is going to be Xi Jinping's banner and its line of, you can say, Xi Jinping's thought for socialism, the Chinese characteristics, which maybe I am shortening to just Xi Jinping's thought, it has been speculated, and perhaps the ongoing 7th plenum, which started on 9th and will finish on 12th, primarily four things, and this is the convention, one is to interrupt the report of the party general secretary, which Xi Jinping was present during the 20th party, the second is the PPI report, which Wang Kuning has made some remarks to, and the party charter, some of the changes, perhaps, you know, declaring or anointing Xi Jinping as the party chairman, and also incorporating his thought in the charter, I mean in the charter form, it's already there, socialism and Chinese characteristics, but in order to bring it in a political model, perhaps it should be done, and then the PPP, you know, which should take on to the proceeding of the 21st party Congress, designating the names, last time there were some 40 plus names on this side, perhaps in a similar amount, mostly reflecting who are going to be in charge, you know, of the Senate committee, and the policy bureau, and the policy bureau standing committee, this would be mostly reflected in the proceeding, but of course, I think, as we, there would also be that, and as far as the execution of, you know, this panel and general policies is concerned, Xi Jinping actually is going to appoint his own people, Xi Jinping, so he will be incorporating his own people, mostly from the places where he has served, for example, Fujian, he has been there for 17 years, then, you know, in Zhejiang, for less than 5 years, and Shanghai, less than 1 year, and the party school, you know, for 5 years, and, and, and, and, this region, so that is that, so he worked for long years, and perhaps a few people from here. As far as, yeah, economies, this is not my formulation, this, I have borrowed from this, Xi Jinping, this is one of the foremost agricultural economists in China, you know, at one of his leading works, so he has formulated it recently, and we can gauge why he has coined people's economy. But as I said, I think we really need to compliment China, as far as the figures are concerned, because they look very good, then Xi Jinping took the mantle of the party back in 2012, China's economy was roughly 8.2, 8.3 trillion US dollars, but now, after a decade, it is around 18 trillion, according to the Chinese statistics, and, for a capital income of the Chinese, it has also doubled from 6,000 dollars in 2012 to 12,000 dollars, roughly, but the widening social inequalities, so they are there, and according to data, 0.14 of the Chinese population, at least, they account for almost 33% of the total GDP of China, so this is huge. Therefore, what has been noted down in 19th Party Congress, the unbalanced and inadequate development and the people's need for a better life, it is going to remain the main contradiction, as far as the 20th Party Congress is concerned, and of course there are various other challenges, as you have been reading, the COVID-19 policy is bad, the bad finances of the local government in announcing to a full-scale investment in storage, and the real estate trouble started by Abagande, which has a tax of over 300 trillion US dollars, and if you take into account other real estate companies, so it comes to around 7.7 trillion US dollars, which is huge, and I think we can talk about it a little later, but as far as foreign policy is concerned, it would be still the framework of two pillars. The pillar one is building the community of shared future for mankind, which is the grand ideal of the human being himself, and then, second, is the major power relationship, which of course takes into account its relationship with the United States, Russia, EU, and another flank of it would be the economic or other relationship, China, with the VR country, or the developing countries, so these would be the two flanks of one body that is building this community of shared future for mankind. As far as India is concerned, I think there would be competition, continual, as I would call it, in various domains in order to diminish its rising influence, whether in the region or global aspirations globally. I think that's it for now, maybe initially, perhaps we can talk it in more detail, so maybe I will also perhaps ask you one small question, because I have seen one of your recent articles and you have stated that Xi Jinping has consolidated its power across the domestic descent, and they're shifting further inward towards totalitarianism. But compared to your formulation, China, you know, gives its own formulation, and the formulation I find that is tranquil and meaningful, or the whole process of democracy, so how do you comment on it, or maybe how did you deduce your idea about inward totalitarianism with China's moving? Thank you very much, in fact, excellent overview, and I don't have much comments to offer, and I would say that I'm so impressed by your impeccable Chinese, don't have much comments to offer to your comments, but what I'm going to do is that I think I'll comment on that article you are referring to, but before that, let me comment on author's report, and this is what I was thinking of, and again, my compliments to Rahul, he has actually named the prince and all his men, but he's in force since this is in the Chinese embassy, so I think I broke the list of saying that Sunovi be emperor instead of prince, and I think that's what my thought process is, but what really is captured in your report is the first sentence in the report, where you write that the 25th Congress is about institutions as well as it is about one individual, and therefore my comment here is that, and linking it with the article you are referring to, my National Interest article about totalitarianism, I think there are three issues we need to discuss, it's not about only party, it's not about only legacies, it's also about China as an institution, China as a state, and I think this is where we need to talk about the 25th Congress, and I think there are three comments I would like to offer here, in context of the 25th Congress, one is that I think if you closely see the party Congress here, the character of party is in question, and I think that is what the world is talking about, and that is what in India we should be talking about, I think if we see from the previous 5th Congress, let's say, China was also a bit more closely than India, but here probably, from the 16th to 17th party Congress, the legacies that have started, the institutionalisation process within the party, that's what we need to look at. So today I think there is a break of that institutionalisation process, and that is a huge question mark for the party's identity and for the future. Secondly, I think what is really problematic within the party today is that I think there is no methodological system, even though they have denounced a long time back that they hate this word democracy, but then they accepted that within that communist umbrella, they leave the democratic institutional norms, they will follow intra-party politics, a kind of selection or election process within the party, even though the party used to be the medium of getting selected to the higher level, but I think within that umbrella, there was some sort of institutionalisation and democratic mediums. That's missing. To this part we are having a problematic political system. The second problematic aspect that I do see, I think here my colleague Professor Narayanan will recall our discussion in our DSA, 15 years back or more, this is about the civil-military discourse. A person commands four positions, he grabs four positions with him, and today all looks good, that there is a huge chemistry between party and military, there is no who in China today, and that was at once, it is easy to believe that the new is solved possibly. But then I think if you go into the deepest of the civil-military discourse, what really says that, obviously the PLA is under the control of state union, primarily because he has his own man in his head, and he has actually taken some actions against the top PLA charge, and that's why the PLA is obeying them. But does that really create a situation of harmony within China? And I think that's the party's structural issue. The second thing is the character of the DSA. What here I would like to do is to compare the personality of Xi Jinping with the previous leadership, particularly with Xi Jinping and Xi Jinping. There was serious power struggle between here, Xi Jinping and Xi Jinping. In fact, those who are following the party politics, party-military politics, they recall that Xi Jinping held the CMC chairman position, even though he was the power. But still, Putin said to them, today there is a gap, there is no second generation, the new generation leaders are in with Xi Jinping and take all the advantages. And I think that's also a problem we can find within the Chinese Communist Party, which actually supports the Kuomintang. The third is, and this is where I was commenting about the House, I think we need to talk about the character of China as a state and as an institution. The world debated hard, but the world also accepted about China one day, that the more we engage with China, the more we invite China, and the way the trend comes out in the cycle with the open foreign policy, probably there will be a much accommodative China, even though China's state on the other side, and as an authoritarian party, there are the Communist Party ruling, and here the democratic countries might not agree, but there is a combination, there is an engagement which is possible. Today, I think that's an issue which is missing, something we are seeing. I think the parliament has entered the process, partly, and partly also the kind of gaps Xi Jinping has created for China. These three problems are serious problems, as far as I look at it. I will come to the economic possibility. I completely agree with you, I think the kind of rosy picture Xi Jinping has shown the world, and to these people, possibly he has achieved something, and that has been the success stories of China. And there the Chinese have actually excelled as a model in world politics. But I think I will go into the details, questioning the China dream. Of course, China's dream was possibly not for the rest of the world, it was for the Chinese people. But when today Xi Jinping claims that he has successfully eradicated poverty in China, that's really not acceptable. And I think here, I recall my speech in IEFA, I think four or five years back, during the 19th Party Congress that I wrote, I think this definition of poverty has to be critically analysed. If you see how the Chinese define poverty, they define poverty as any person's income, poverty income is something like 1.9 US dollars per day, which is around 1330 RMB or something. I mean, that's not much, to be honest. And it's unbelievable when Xi Jinping is saying that in 130 RMB, a person can live in China and pay it, as it's almost impossible. But I think what is more problematic here is that if we compare the Chinese perspective of poverty eradication with the UN perspective and definition of poverty eradication, UN states that if you are putting a bar above poverty, that's like 2 dollars per day. So that's the oil-stained person, or oil-stained drugs, and that's a huge amount when we talk about the populist society like China. And the more problematic is, it's not first the definition of poverty, it's more about what will constitute the poverty and how do we eradicate the poverty. The income, the facilities, and the resources, and the rehabilitation process, not to harm the poverty further. And I think even though one can agree that by saying that the Chinese have successfully established a lot of infrastructure in the poor areas, and those who have travelled to the rural areas, they will completely agree with the model they've built, but then we know for a fact that those poor Chinese have been moved to the big cities in China, in Beijing and Shanghai, they will find it difficult to survive. Yeah, so I think you're right as far as these institutionalizations, institutions are there, they are in question now. And Xi Jinping is systematically maybe eroding them or destroying them. You must have seen these new regulations, revised regulations, which were brought out recently. Now, essentially, you can say revision, especially as far as the Clause 4, 5, and 6 of these 2015 regulations are concerned, it deals with the term limit and age limit. So that is essentially this Qishan Baxia, 7 of 8, has been totally demolished. So it is the limbs and fences of Xi Jinping whom to bring in and whom to kick out. So therefore, his clique, as I've said, you know, it's built from Fujian, from Zhejiang, from Shanghai, the new Shanghai clique, because there is already one, you know, Shanghai clique, and then from the party schools, so these people would be promoted. And I think mostly Fujian clique, it would be heavily incorporated into the Senate Committee, especially, you know, the Politburo, 25 members. Out of now, he has 12. So this may go up to, say, 60 to 70 percent, which is a little—right now, it is a little less than 50 percent. He has 12 only. And so these exact people, like if you were interested in the names, or I think it may be some other times, like Wang Xiaogong would be there, Cai Xi would be there, He Weizhong is there, Wang Kunming would be there, and John Blumen, Miao Huai, and He Weizhong. So two of the people who are likely to be incorporated as vice chairmen of the American Commission. Miao Huai is already there, but he is likely to be promoted, most likely. And then from Fujian clique, this Li Chang, Tan Binai, you know, Lou Yangsheng, Zhao Yide, Chen Yixin, Tang Yijun, and so on and so forth, these people are also there. But mostly, I think, it would be in the Senate Committee. And some, for example, from New China clique, Ding Shuixiang, you know, he is the person to be watched for perhaps, would be groomed as successor of him and successor of Xi Jinping, that's how I think. And then from Party school, people like Li Shulei and Shi Caifeng, so they would also be incorporated. And Shanxi, this Lin Xiang, and Kansu, so they're also, you know, Li Xi, this Guangdong provincial secretary, is also there. Mostly, I think, it would be dominated by Fujian clique. As far as the Kus are concerned, I think this is very interesting. I think there have been Kus. In fact, Bo Xilai, Fairventorium Kang, is one of the Kus, if you talk about. And this is evident because you say Gou Fuxiong and Shi Caifeng, so these were the people of Jiangsu. And they were essentially, you know, one Jiang clan, or Jiang clansmen's office in the Central Military Commission, which was, you can say, supervising activities of Hu Jintao, and Hu Jintao was not having, you know, freedom to act upon on his own. So now these factions, especially Jiang and some factions, and it will be perhaps Hu Jintao himself, it's up to him to have this office built in that perhaps Xi Jinping would not have been able to, you know, do the kind of things he's doing at this point in time. So you are right, you know, when you are saying that there is a sort of like a contradiction when Xi Jinping talks about poverty eradication, absolute poverty according to him, and also the task, the main task of the 19th Party Congress, it was, you know, to build China into a moderately prosperous society, which China believes, which China believes that they have already done it. So they are moving into the next stage, which is in two steps, you know, as we know, from 2020 to 35, and from 35 to 2049, when China would be a great innovator, you know, at the world stage and perhaps state in the region. But the problem, one, as far as the poverty definition is concerned, is problematic, and secondly, it has been countered by Li Keqiang himself, you know, that more than 600 Chinese people, so they have, you know, 10,000. In fact, this is what's interesting, I was reading one of your comments, and therefore I would take your conversation to ask you a little further upon that. How do you see, what are the possibilities that in terms of tax and employment, do you still think that after the transition of the Congress of the Party, do you still think that the dissent against Xi Jinping still might continue, and who are these people who might lead, and who might really pose a challenge? And the second question is that who is the next leader in waiting? Is he really going to announce, or they are going to announce in the Party, or how long have they been keeping it before announcing? I think I will answer your last question first. I don't think he's going to announce any successor, so that is a fact, you know. I think that maybe Deng Lijiang is probably perhaps true, but you don't know, you know, once you announce your successor, then in Chinese history we have seen that China has faced a lot of trouble, whether it was with the Libya or, you know, and others. So I don't think so, but I think this factionalism has to be seen in two contexts. One is the political context, and another is the economic context. And that's why we see the Chinese discourse, I'm talking in terms of political coups and financial coups, you know, so I think they are related. As far as political coups are concerned, so these are, you know, very much, I would say, engineered, you know, by Jiang and some factions, as it is generally believed. And it is because of Jiang Zemin and some people across all the apparatus, whether it is military, you know, we have cited the example of Guo Boxiong and Xu Caihou, they were in fact Jiang's people, keeping an eye on everything, and whether it is public security, or even now the, you know, you can say, political and legal enforcement agencies. In fact, Xi Jinping, to start with, he stayed away from, took control of the army, which is very important, and it is on this basis he believes that, you know, the colour of China's rivers and mountains, it cannot be changed. And he categorically says, 不允许让河南改变江山变色, so that's what he's saying. And I think it is from this perspective he believes that princely, right, the prince, they have the flesh and blood relationship with the people, not, you know, the people like Tuo Wenji, not the people like Wen Jiabao, not the people, you know, other those who don't have this blood relationship. So this is in fact one warning to his distractors that this so-called tiger and sly skin pen is going to continue, you know, even after he's anointed for the third time. And as far as this legal, you know, political and legal enforcement, this was the last, I think, domain where Xi Jinping has not entered, and he discovered that some of the people here, they were, you know, having allergies to these people, that we distracted, and we see the case of Sun Lichun, we see the case of Su Donghua, we see the case of Wang Likun, and that of course, in fact, they were part and parcel, is, you know, believe that they were planning to assassinate Xi Jinping, whether, you know, it is true or not, but Xi Jinping feels perhaps that way. And the second, which is the most important component, that is the financial tool, I think, here, because most of them felt the financial nerve of China is at the hands of Jiang and Sun faction. So which is extremely important, that's why we see Xi Jinping establishing another stock exchange in Beijing, and the stock exchange of Shanghai, Shenzhen, even Hong Kong, so they have been controlled by his detractors. And you won't, you know, believe that the princelings, you know, for example, Jiang Zemin's grandson, Jiang Zicheng, the oil capitalist son by name, and Zhou Yunlai, who is the former CEO of CICC Alpha, and the son of Premier Zhou Longqi. If you see, financial insurance, so this is run by Wei Yapao's family, and the chairman of the city capital, you know, one of the economic giants in China, is run by the former, a son of former Politburo Standing Committee, Liu Yuxiang. So this is what Xi Jinping fears the most, so that the financial nerve of the country is with his detractors, and Hong Kong crackdown, you know, to some extent, one of the reasons is also this control by these people. So, I think it is in this context, I think, you know, though the kind of factionalism we have witnessed, say, during 17th Party Congress, 18th Party Congress, even 19th Party Congress, I think this kind of factionalism, perhaps, is wanting to dimash, you know, all sort of factional politics within the party. I think I'll also ask you one more question as far as economy is concerned. You also mentioned in one of your recent articles that China is fast losing its capital building competitive advantage. You know, how did you deduce this, and are you just indicating to China's, I guess, comprehensive national strength built during the reform period, and how has it been eluded in the new era, as advised Xi Jinping, you know, perhaps you are referring to new era, as Xi Jinping took the reins of party in China. My statement was more political than economic, and not an economist, so how do I see this China losing the competitive advantage? I think for that we have to look more from an outreach point of view, how the Chinese are actually positioning themselves, and how previously they have positioned themselves in a way they are actually losing out on lots of other things. As far as economy is concerned, that has been the success story of the party, and the party over the years has characterized that, and therefore we know for a fact that probably despite the pandemic, despite the crisis, we are not getting the intended results. The Chinese economy has done well, the leadership is backing on that, and probably it will continue to survive. And the world is also partly dependent on the Chinese economy. So therefore, this China losing the competitive advantage should not be raised in economic terms. But what I mean essentially is that it has to be understood in China's political control culture. How this economy is being controlled, and which China is actually losing of the international market. One is that if you see the recent case of Xi Jinping, the Chinese Canadian businessman who has been in the trade for 14 years, I think his company was fined for $8 billion fee to pay. And that's a huge amount, and if you see the track record of that gentleman, he was a successful business person who was drawing the bridge between the West and the Chinese businessmen. And that was not really going well with the party. Similarly, if we take the example of Jack Ma, in fact one interesting article which came across his statement from Jack Ma, where he said that, you know, I'm the richest man in China, few have good endings. So I think the corporate sectors are already feeling some pressure. The thing which was started during Hu Jintao's period, that China opening up economically, China going overseas, and having that kind of engaging with the foreign companies and asking them to go for a future joint venture, that's not a mistake. And I think there, I think the Chinese are emerging on the competitive advantage of having overseas partners. The second thing I think which needs to be also talked about, the role of the state-owned enterprises. I think there was a time in my first book, I thought that if we go into the history of the state-owned enterprises, they played a significant role. In fact, the whole process of the BRI was introduced, and it's one thing to say that the BRI was introduced in 2013, but if we go to the Chinese economic and political history, BRI was actually introduced during the start, during the initial years of Hu Jintao. He introduced a few policy measures, so what essentially we talked about that he introduced, actually it was already introduced during Hu Jintao. The overseas going, you know, having overseas ports, you know, establishing the stationing point, the ports, you know, constructing new maritime ports in terms of trade extended. So these are actually old stories of the Chinese. Now there, the state-owned enterprises, they were given a task to perform and, you know, give up, bring back the riches. And I think under 1610, they are feeling some great. Even within the BRI scheme, they were empowered to some way, given a mandate to perform, not giving them impressive results. And what state-owned enterprises in China are asking is a foreign collaboration. And I think that is becoming difficult for 1610 to offer them, it will just go ahead and, you know, enter into the joint venture. Even though we have so many examples of the BRI, to say that the Chinese businessmen and foreign businessmen are cooperating on the projects best, but whether it is on an equal basis, whether there is transparency, whether there is norms which are of interest to China, those are subjective, and therefore the Chinese state-owned enterprises are unable to keep their international presence and they are struggling to, you know, find their right foot in terms of the market. The last point in connection to that competition with China, losing out on the competition advantage, is that it is one thing to see a BRI that is the fastest in its way of shifting things, and possibly after the 20th part, the BRI will continue and they would like to bring new initiatives, new schemes to revitalize the whole BRI process. But I mean, I would say that BRI has both success and failures. In India and many other countries, we have this tendency of downplaying the BRI, which is absolutely right from a national security point of view, from a national sovereignty point of view, the BRI is not acceptable to us. But we cannot simply dismiss BRI just on a face value. BRI has had success in Central Asia, today China has displaced the Japanese, today China has displaced the Russians, and right after the Ukraine, they are going to do it more. In Southeast Asia, even the Japanese have the strongest economic bearer there, investors there, the Chinese are gradually taking that place. So it is all through the BRI, and we can see the same thing happening in the Southeast countries. But on the contrary, where I do see that the Chinese are actually using all the competition advantage, is that lack of insight, lack of meeting the international norms, even in the new BRI schemes, they have introduced more environmental friendly schemes, let's say they are trying to be so transparent, but we know for a fact that BRI is a national project, it is linked with the Chinese government, it's not. So therefore I would say that, interestingly if you see, I think after the Ukraine war, the way the Chinese have supported the Russians, they are also losing out advantages in India, we can discuss that later on. So it's more of a political statement to say that the Chinese are losing out the competition advantages, they created themselves for over the last 22, 23 years. But I'll come back to you. Yeah, well I think economically too it can be proved, because you see the kind of economic slump China has reached next off-plate. In fact, World Bank has said that they are not being able to reach the target of 5.5, which the Chinese government has said. You know, for this financial year, they would be existing at a growth rate of 1.5% perhaps. And most of the projections, whether economics like, the info, you know, that if China is able to register a growth rate of, moderate growth rate of, say 4.5% between 2020 to 2035, you know, they would be able to register per capita income of over 30,000 US dollars by 2035. And for that, you're required to double the present GDP, which is around 18 trillion US dollars, which seems a little difficult task. Secondly, I think the world has also come to a witness that China was, you know, free riding, right? So it has been termed as a reignist power. That means, you know, the kind of commitment it had to the liberal international order when they started reforms, so they have, you know, recapted from that commitment. So that is one thing. And another, perhaps it is also important, maybe we will be discussing that under this foreign policy, the ideological confrontation, though it is taking shape at this point in time. So that has also perhaps, you know, eroded China's competitive advantage, if you believe the few research, you know, which has been published recently in the world countries. So the rating, you know, of disapproval is as high as 83%, for example. So this is one of the indications. And I think largely, especially in the last three years, they have to be glad for themselves because of these re-COVID restrictions. As a result, this is their own statistical bureau giving the numbers that almost 466,000 state-owned enterprises and 1.5 million small and medium enterprises in China, they have gone bust. So it is massive. So you can imagine the kind of economic loss. So they are suffering. And if the COVID-0 continues, which I think is going to continue for some time, China's economy will further slow down. And as far as the rivalry is concerned, I would like to give you just a small example of this chip war with the West, primarily the United States, right, which I think we cannot ignore because chips, they are going to the fuel of the fourth industrial revolution, and China has already made it public through their MAGA programs, that they made in China in 2025, on the big fund that they created in 2014 for developing chips. And you want to imagine that at present there are 142,900 chip-related companies listed in China. And of course many are becoming, going bust also, but new ones being added. For example, in 2022, over 30,800 new companies were registered. With huge, massive capital, if you see, the kind of capital that they have generated from 2014, the first phase, in 2018, and then from 2019 to 2021, it is over 50 billion dollars. And that is a issue that, you know, I would maybe perhaps all the time issue as a committee for the new chip act of theirs, right? And if you still see the ratio, even from 3 to 4, the kind of money they have, it is much, much larger. So, I think we should discuss a little bit more about the foreign policy issues. So, I invite your comments. How do you see, what are the implications this party conference might lead for China's foreign policy approach, and in terms of outreach and other conflicting issues? I think as far as foreign policy is concerned, so I think the framework which I talked about, you know, up front, it is going to remain the same, and the focus is going to be to build a community-based shared future. So, that is one thing, and we are a part and parcel of that. So, it is going to continue, even though the kind of investments they have committed in the initial years is not going to be that. The way they committed, you know, 23, 24, invested 23, 24 billion dollars in Pakistan, 13 almost billion dollars in Bangladesh. I think this kind of mega project, you know, this is gone, because China itself, you know, I would say, the kind of leather fair, you know, the heat up leather fair they enjoy, so they won't be able to afford, they are in cash trap, you know, I don't think they would be able to. But I think as far as the big poverty diplomacy or the major poverty diplomacy is concerned, that would be the focus, and I think it would continue along the lines of what Yang Jiechi told Jeff Suleiman and the Secretary of State that may go a major further, that the US doesn't have enough qualification to talk from the point of strength. So, I think this is going to continue, and they are going to be more assertive, because we see the kind of status quo they have been changing on the ground, right? They have changed it initially to start with the South China Sea, done in the India-China border, and now the Thailand Strait, the Indian Line, so it is gone. So, I think they are going to be assertive, this assertiveness is going to be there, but of course, I think the competition continues, the way we talked about it in the context of India and China, China would continue to do it also with the United States, because they would not be averse to cooperating wherever they could cooperate with the United States, and also they won't try to take the conflict to perhaps another level where they cannot afford to do that. And Taiwan, of course, is going to be one of the flashpoints, but I don't think it will be the place where the war would be fought. I think if there is any confrontation, it is going to be South China Sea, not Thailand Strait. And as far as EU is concerned, China would continue to maybe create some of the fissures in EU, and we have seen the reports that, you know, Shoal is visiting China in the first week of November, he perhaps would be the first in Italy, and of course, I think that is also in the wake of this Ukraine-Russia conflict, where Germany has faced such a problem. I think you are more appropriate to comment on that, so I think maybe I will ask you briefly to comment on, because the party congress did prominently pick up Taiwan question year and again, and this time perhaps it won't be any different, unification through military force, they have been talking about all the time, but we really kind of used force at least before the 100th anniversary of the PLA, you know, which is later to be in 2027. So on two specific questions, let me comment. One is on the Taiwan issue, and second is on the China-U.S. cooperation. On the Taiwan question, I think from the 17th party congress onwards, there was this dual debate, whether it is going to be peaceful unification or it is going to be forceful unification. Now I think we are coming to a conclusion, of the forceful unification is the most probable one, the way it turned out to be. I think there are two cases we need to keep in mind. One is the target, how early this forceful occupation is going to happen. Second is that, what is the strategy, the strategy being implemented. I think, as you rightly pointed out, 2035-2049 goal, that of course factored Taiwan. But today I think from the 19th party congress onwards, and in the last work report we saw, there was an explicit mention about Taiwan, so this party congress report also, definitely will carry more explicitly about Taiwan. The point here is that how quickly they are going to have this military invasion. It is one thing to focus, probably to say that, you know, after Nancy Pelosi's visit, the kind of military exhibition we saw, probably the Chinese will be in a readiness to do something over the next few years. Yes, they will be doing it, but I am disengaging those notions which suggest that there will be a military occupation completely. I don't think it is going to be a complete overall military occupation. It is going to be an incremental military occupation. And what do I mean by incremental military occupation? I think they will be targeted, as you rightly pointed out, the South China Sea first. And we have seen already a change happening in the South China Sea. The militarization of the South China Sea islands, the first target would be the Haiqing island. They occupy there, and then they move to the two other islands which are critical to Taiwan, that is the Kinmen island and the Hongqiao island. These are the three islands they will be aiming for. Once they occupy those, and therefore I do say that it is going to be not a full occupation, it is going to be an incremental military occupation of targeting the Taiwan first. And then probably we will be seeing how the world is reacting, how the university countries are reacting. Of course, the most strongest power in the region, the United States of America, is reacting, and the power powers are reacting. And today I think there is also a vacuum which has been created, and that is how the science strategy moved, is that Japan has lost its weapon. And I think that is one of the most important factors, because I don't really see Kishida acting in the same way. If we see Prime Minister Kishida's foreign policy strategy, even though he looks more engaging towards Taiwan, whether he is going to follow that model of having more security within the Taiwan, that is yet to be seen. Because of course, Japan would like to also economically keep its door open as far as Taiwan is concerned. Coming back quickly, so therefore my take on Taiwan would be that it is going to be an incremental military, and whether that is going to be four to five years period or ten years period, we will see. But definitely it is not going to be 20 to 30 years here. So the Chinese have really, you know, pre-formed their target base as far as Taiwan is concerned. Quickly on the China and the boundaries, so I think this is where I have been trying to study the patterns, and a few days back we were discussing in Singapore, we found the finest lines on the China-U.S. relations. I think what Gavish has said, and I would buy that point, is that he has said that the biggest emerging inter-Mex phase, the next time emerging inter-Mex phase, is on the maritime domain. And I think I would go there. Even though we are seeing all of these incidents happening on the western border and in the Middle East sector, we saw not so much in the eastern sector. But I think these patterns only suggest that the Chinese are here just to disturb the trade. They are just to disturb the status quo. They are delaying the negotiation process. So the Chinese strategy is to keep India busy in terms of getting the child. But I don't really see that the Chinese are here to occupy something as far as India is concerned, even though they are integrating with India, which is continuing after the end statement that, you know, the Chinese are not really occupying territory. That's for another day, another debate. But I think the broad implications of China's 20th Party Congress and India's concern, I think we will see the continuous, periodical, in China, you know, China-related problems on the boundaries. But I think India has been more testing on the maritime domains from the neighbors. And I think that is the most severe problem for India in the next few years to come. But I think probably on those specific boundaries, we might see something happening on the eastern sector because for the last 10 years, we don't really see the Chinese giving a that open statement on power and autonomous affairs the way they have actually given a statement in the first decade of the 21st century. And that's pretty frustrating because they are waiting for a key Solyanist Dalai Lama to, you know, to do a demise. And, you know, they would try to apply that logic that the 6th Dalai Lama was born here. So I think the same calculus, Chinese strategy, which has been implemented in India, and the complete 20th Party Congress will just take it forward to the next level. But I will stop here and probably we will have some comments and questions to discuss. I think we still have four or five minutes. We have been asked to conclude by 7.45. So maybe one last comment on India-China, the border issue. There is no doubt that China has a Chinese status quo on the ground. There is no denying the fact, whether you take it in the petroleum point 14, whether you take it in the petroleum point 15, or, you know, various other petroleum points, right, from 10 to 13, in that sort of range. So it's a huge area, almost 900 square kilometres, it has been denied to us, where we used to patrol. And if you take into account the charting data for this area, this is also huge, almost 1000 square kilometres. So essentially, I think, 1900 square kilometres of area has been denied to India for the charting. So it is, you know, very, very serious. And the second thing is, and China may replicate the same thing, like creating blockers in various other friction points. And make the more friction points. And the second thing is, you know, the kind of so-called poverty alleviation villages they are building along the border areas. To start with the Toklam, you know, fortified their positions. And also in Roongchoo, you know, which according to other understandings, is to the south of Mack mobile. And though it has been pronounced a legacy issue, but still, it is there within the perceived boundary, south of Mack mobile. And this, perhaps, is an answer to Wenjia Bao's 2005 visit and the declaration we signed. And then the objective, the Chinese proposal of handing over Taungon to them, saying that there is no question of uprooting the federal population. But China, perhaps, is settling their population through these poverty alleviation villages. You know, so not only across India-China, not only along the India-China line of actual control, but also in Bhutan. So you mentioned that they have not been asking, but I think they are playing a bigger game. If you see the conflict with Bhutan, apart from these whole northern areas and all those inner-western areas, which, you know, the fish were swapped, they have created another in the east, just below Dala, substantially, this environmental sanctuary, right? So I think it is there. India needs to be very, very watchful of. And third point is the kind of infrastructure they are building, you know, down side of the border. If I may point to the expenditure during the 13th fighter plan and 14th fighter plan, you know, from 2016 to 2021, altogether, put together, is more than 43 billion US dollars that they have spent in Tirtha Taungon. And the kind of floors they have built, I remember our Minister of Defence in 2008-2009, Mr. Anthon, making a statement in the Parliament that China has built 56,000 square kilometres of roads in 30,000 square kilometres of sand, today has reached around 120,000 kilometres. So I think this is a concern, so which India needs to be given more importance.