Details
Most agree that we were not well served by too much caution and appeasement in World War I and II. Military leaders saw early American lack of involvement as being a mistake. However, the pendulum can also swing to the other side.
Details
Most agree that we were not well served by too much caution and appeasement in World War I and II. Military leaders saw early American lack of involvement as being a mistake. However, the pendulum can also swing to the other side.
Comment
Most agree that we were not well served by too much caution and appeasement in World War I and II. Military leaders saw early American lack of involvement as being a mistake. However, the pendulum can also swing to the other side.
The speaker discusses the consequences of both excessive caution and overconfidence in military engagements throughout history. They emphasize the need for careful assessment of each decision, considering its specific costs, benefits, and risks. The speaker also highlights the importance of open conflict resolution and cost-benefit analysis in confronting harmful ideologies. They suggest exploring alternative strategies that align with democratic principles and core values. The speaker questions the effectiveness and rationale behind certain military actions and calls for a new political party that prioritizes transparency and evidence-based decision-making. Most agree that we were not well served by too much caution and appeasement in World War I and World War II. Military leaders saw early American lack of involvement as being a mistake. However, the pendulum can swing too far the other way. Our subsequent military engagements in the Cold War, Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan, South America, and Kosovo reveal the devastating financial and human cost of overconfidence and undue reliance on power, and confronting so-called evil early on before it has a chance to get a beachhead doesn't always work. and concern about the deals with the devil that we make, and with people who don't share our values. These are, of course, simplifications, but what we can all agree on is that these actions provide stark warnings about the limits of military power without first winning the war of ideas. Rather than swinging between extremes, for example, too little or too much power, or forcing different challenges into a single narrative, we must evaluate each decision individually. Each issue demands a careful assessment of its specific cost, benefits, and risk. The strength of our calculations and the effectiveness of our plans should be directly tied to the quality of the evidence that either support or undermine them. Reflecting on Oppenheimer's legacy and the resources squandered in these conflicts, we recognize the waste that comes from applying outdated solutions to new problems. It is said that when Mr. President was asked, Do you think God is on our side? He replied, My concern is not whether God is on our side. My greatest concern is to be on God's side. The rationale for this is that God is always right. So that has some self-doubt and some necessary perspective. This perspective emphasizes the need for self-scrutiny and systematic evaluation of each action's pros, cons, costs, and benefits. While defeating an enemy may sometimes be unavoidable, a lasting solution requires a more nuanced approach. We must confront harmful ideologies in our own society and also in our adversaries. The essential tools of this effort are open conflict resolution and cost-benefit analysis. Resorting to one-sided propaganda is not a sustainable long-term strategy. Every idea, even honest versions of those from our adversaries, must go through a conflict resolution and cost-benefit analysis. Our commitment to openness, transparency, and rational thinking align with our democratic principles and provide the best route to a peaceful world. The real battle is against error, not terror, or against those we label as enemies. As J. Reuben Clark said, If we have the truth, it cannot be harmed by investigation. If we have not the truth, it ought to be harmed. Power is not an ultimate safety solution. Our military leaders just thought if they built enough nuclear weapons, we would always be secure. Power has the potential to corrupt, and unchecked power corrupts absolutely. The U.S. cannot impose a world order without convincing others that our choices are sound. As history has shown, failure to understand this will lead to repeated costly mistakes. It's time to explore alternative strategies that better align with our core values of openness, reasoning, and offering a more sustainable path forward. I'm talking about Radio Free Europe, where we set up radio broadcast stations to tell our side of the story and send that into the Soviet Union. So we need to group all the similar ways of saying the same thing, group reasons to agree and disagree, potential costs and benefits, and why these costs and benefits are more or less likely. We need to evaluate each argument and bit of evidence for logical cohesiveness, level of verification, importance, and relevance. We need to be strong, but did building three times the number of nuclear weapons we currently have ensure our strength, or could the $10.9 trillion, or some portion of it, have been spent differently? So we now have 10,000 nuclear weapons. It is assumed that we could take out 10,000 of the biggest cities in Russia, which wouldn't leave very many cities left. We had, at the peak, I think it was 32,000 nuclear weapons. So why did we build 32 if we now only think we needed 10? Well, we just wanted to be strong. We wanted power. Like Gollum, our military and political leaders just wanted power. Yeah, it cost $10.9 trillion. Anyways, was it the right choice? I don't know. But did they have a public debate? Did they use the power of democracy? Did they use the power of openness to come to that conclusion? Or were there people in a smoke-filled room just making decisions? Did Iraq have weapons of mass destruction? On the surface, it seemed like it. If they didn't have weapons of mass destruction, why wouldn't they let the UN inspect? That's what was asked. That's what George Bush said. These arguments sound convincing, but they proved to be wrong. I think George Bush was honestly convinced that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction. Would our world have been different, though, had we outlined all the reasons to go to war and all of the reasons to not go to war and done a complete cost-benefit analysis that involves contributions from all over the world to evaluate the validity of all of the assumptions and likelihood of each of the actions or the likelihood of each of the results? If we had done this with humility instead of with confidence and power and bravado, if we would have shown all of our math and shown and proved in an honest analysis that looked at all of the con or counter-arguments, wouldn't we have had more support? Again, I read the book Oppenheimer, and it's an interesting book. He was trying to warn about the limitations of military power during the Cold War, but you know, we went into Korea, we went into Vietnam, we went to Iraq, we went into Afghanistan, we did stuff in South and Central America, in Kosovo, and each time we thought, you know, this is going to be easy, this is going to be a cakewalk, we have the power, I've got the power. It's like He-Man. But we didn't convince hearts and minds, we didn't do a thorough analysis, we didn't do a cost-benefit analysis. So we can just keep the same political system that we have, but we need a new political party as an alternative to the Republican and Democrat parties that promises to only support candidates that show which arguments they accept and which arguments they reject, to give each argument a score, and to show, just like Benjamin Franklin did, that the weight of the evidence for the things that they do is greater than the weight of the evidence against the things that they support. That's all I'm asking. I hope you will join me, or at least provide feedback. Thanks, and look forward to hearing from you. Goodbye.