Graham

Thomas Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and has a strong background in Russian studies. His interest in Russia began during the Cold War when he witnessed the launch of Sputnik in 1957. He studied Russian in high school and went on to major in Russian studies in college. He then pursued a career in foreign policy and politics, serving as a diplomat in Moscow and later working as a business consultant and researcher. His first extended period in the Soviet Union was during Mikhail Gorbachev's reform efforts. Okay. Hello, everybody. And I welcome you all to the Politics Unpacked podcast. And I feel extremely honored to meet our expert today. Thomas Graham is a Distinguished Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. He's a co-founder of Yale University's Russian, East European, and Eurasian Studies program, and sits on its Faculty Steering Committee. He's also a Research Fellow at Yale's McMillan Center. He has been a lecturer in Global Affairs and Political Science since 2011, teaching courses on U.S.-Russian relations and Russian foreign policy, as well as cybersecurity and counterterrorism. Thomas was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007, during which he managed the White House Kremlin Strategic Dialogue. Additionally, he was a Director for Russian Affairs on the staff from 2002 to 2004. I welcome you, Thomas. Glad to be with you. So, I would like to ask you some personal questions. And it is pretty uncommon for a growing-up person to be interested in Russian studies, just as you did. How did that come up? Where does that interest come from? Well, you know, remember, when I was growing up, it was a quite different situation. It was in the midst of the Cold War. My interest in Russia initially was the launch of Sputnik in 1957, which was a major event and a major shock to most people in the United States at this point, and the fear that Russia, or the Soviet Union at that time, was going to overtake or outcompete the United States in the technological and space ranks. So, that is something that initially piqued my interest. I had the advantage of going to one of the first high schools in the United States that offered Russian as a second language, as a foreign language, in Princeton, New Jersey, in the 1960s. And so, there was plenty to keep me interested in Russia at that point. And then, when I went to university, I studied Russian studies with my major. That was a very popular major back in the late 60s and the early 1970s, in part because Russia and the Soviet Union was seen as the major foreign policy challenge for the United States, and there were many, many young people who were interested in either diplomacy, foreign policy, or so forth, that thought that they should know something about this country. So, have you ever considered a career in foreign policy and politics or research? Well, I mean, that's what I've done, right? You know, after I finished my education, I spent a number of years in the U.S. Foreign Service as a diplomat, served two tours of duty at our embassy in Moscow at the very end of the Cold War in the middle of the 1990s. So, that was the diplomatic part of it, but a lot of what I did on the ground. I would also gather information about Russia, report back to Washington about what I thought the conditions were like in Russia, how the political system was developing, what the implications of that were for American foreign policy. You know, since I left the Foreign Service and Government Service, I have worked as a business consultant. I've also worked at a research institution. So, you know, over the many, many years of involvement in Russia, I've been a collector of information, I've been an analyst, I've been a policymaker. I think I get that right. You've been to the Soviet Union at that time for the first time in your life through the Foreign Service. Is that right? No, no. I actually had an opportunity to go to the Soviet Union a bit earlier as part of an educational exchange program in the early 1980s. But it was as a diplomat connected with the American Embassy that I spent my first very prolonged period in the Soviet Union, three and a half, four years in total. So how was that experience when you came to Russia or the Soviet Union at that time for the first time? Well, again, it was a, it's always an interesting time in Moscow. When I was working at the U.S. Embassy, it was particularly interesting because this was the years of Soviet leaders, Mikhail Gorbachev's effort to reform the Soviet Union, to open up the economy and the political system in order to jumpstart Russia's economy, to maintain Russia's, the Soviet Union's status as the other superpower well into the 21st century. So it was an exciting time to be there. The system was beginning to open up. There was an opportunity to meet a lot of Soviet citizens, to meet people who worked in media and government and so forth, things that had actually been closed to American diplomats for much of the Cold War. 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So when do you think were those changing moments during his presidency in which it changed from an uprising Russia for better living standards for the people, for a better economy, for a better political system, to a much more authoritarian government? to a much more authoritarian government? Well, I mean, it's a gradual process. Well, I mean, it's a gradual process. I think in Putin's second term as president, I think in Putin's second term as president, he was much more concerned about foreign influence inside Russia began to crack down on non-governmental organizations, civil society entities that received funding from the United States or Europe, for example. And that is the first sort of evidence of a turning of the screws and a cutting back or narrowing of the space for political expression. and a cutting back or narrowing of the space for political expression. Russia really grows dramatically when Putin comes back to the Kremlin in 2012. Russia really grows dramatically when Putin comes back to the Kremlin in 2012. This is after the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. This is after the global financial crisis of 2008 and 2009. The economy is not growing as rapidly as it was during the first two terms of Putin's presidency. So he can't rely on an ever-improving economic So he can't rely on an ever-improving economic situation as a basis for his political popularity. situation as a basis for his political popularity. And he turns towards patriotism or national unity as the basis for his popularity. or national unity as the basis for his popularity. And that leads to an increasing authoritarian system inside Russia. The country is also much more at odds with the West, particularly the United States. And you see growing tension between the United States and Russia at this point. And there are a series of events that I think we all know about that underscore the growing distance between Russia and Europe and the United States. The seizure of Crimea in 2014. The fomenting of rebellion in eastern Ukraine at that time. The intervention in Syria in 2015. To save a dictator Bashar al-Assad almost a certain defeat at the hands of various rebel forces. Interference in the US elections in 2016. Interference in the elections of a number of European states in 2017, 2018 and so forth. All this culminates in the massive invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. So you could almost conclude that the growing of democracy in Russia or the rise of Putin's presidency ends with the financial crisis in 2012. After he doesn't have the economic support anymore with his government. Well, I mean, the economy is much less of a support for his political position than it was in his first two terms as president. Because the economy is not growing at a rapid clip. In fact, if you look at the 2010s, the Russian economy in that decade barely grows at all. So you're a part of the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007. And how was the strategy towards Russia at that time? Well, actually, I was there from 2002 to 2007. Oh, I'm sorry. But the goal at that point was to build a partnership with Russia. Now, particularly with regard to fighting against terrorism at that point. Fighting against terrorism at that point. But it was the hope that it would spread to other areas as well. And we'd have a largely cooperative relationship that would be good for security in Europe. Would help us deal with the challenges of international terrorism. Would retard the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Would deal with various regional problems in ways that were satisfactory from the standpoint of American interest and Russian interest as well. So the vision was one of a strategic partnership between the two countries. The reality was somewhat different. So how did that cooperation grow? For example, for countering terrorism. Has the Russians been cooperative in this field with the U.S.? Well, in the initial period after the attacks of September 11th in the United States, they supported the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan to deal with the Taliban and al Qaeda at that point. They provided safe passage to Russia into Afghanistan. They provided us with intelligence that they had about the situation inside Afghanistan itself. And so it was fairly close cooperation for the first year or two after the attacks of 9-11. So besides countering terrorism, how did you think was a strategic dialogue built in between Russia and the U.S. and Europe? Do you think it was something that was leading the world forward or more backwards? How is the cooperation going? How can I imagine the communication from a National Security Council and the adequate thing in Russia? Well, I mean, it was a period positive in many ways. You know, the United States and Russia did sign a nuclear arms control agreement at that point. As I said, we were working together on counterterrorism by the United States and Russia. Our European allies worked closely in trying to constrain Iran's nuclear ambitions at that point. We worked closely with the Russians and some others in dealing with North Korea's nuclear ambitions at that time. The European Union and Russia set up a number of cooperative programs. And you saw an upsurge in commercial activities between Russia and Europe at that time. So there was a lot of positive things that were happening in the first years of Putin's presidency in Russia. If we look back to the strategy at that point and the strategy today, how did it change? I mean, we know the certain developments in global politics which led to a major change in the strategy between the U.S., Europe and Russia. How did it change and what do you think is today's goal of dialogue between those countries? Well, look, I mean, the major difference is that in the 2000s, you know, the West, Europe and the United States was talking about cooperation with Russia and we saw it as a largely cooperative endeavor even though there were some difficulties at that time. Nobody's talking about a cooperative relationship at this point. It's one of competition, certainly competition. Russia believes that it's engaged in a proxy war against the West. You know, it's clear that we are on opposite sides of the conflict in Ukraine. And we go through the list of issues where we are on the opposite side from Russia. And so it's one of very stark competition bordering on confrontation between Russia on the one hand, Europe and the United States on the other. So, I mean, this major competition probably began with the start of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Eastern Ukraine, is that right? Yeah, that's when it begins in a significant way. So, how do you personally think did that conflict in Eastern Ukraine evolve? That's a long, long, long story. Let's try to keep it short but without leaving out the important events. Is it just how people frame it? Did it start in 2022? Did it start in 2014? Is there a deeper question in between Ukrainian culture and Russian culture? Is there one point which people leave out which you would like to mention? Well, I mean, the issue of Ukraine was always a major one for Russia, for the West. You know, certainly after the breakup of the Soviet Union. And the question revolved around what Ukraine's geopolitical orientation would be. Would it be aligned with Russia? Or would it actually drift towards alignment with the Euro-Atlantic community, with Europe and the United States at that point? You need to understand the importance that Ukraine has in the Russian imagination. Russia traces its statehood back to Kiev and Rus' in the 19th century. The territory that is now Ukraine is in many ways the cradle of Russian civilization. The territory of Ukraine was an important buffer zone for Russia historically against adversaries to the South and to the West for many, many centuries. And the territory of Ukraine was also a very important element of Russia's industrial production, agricultural capabilities, and a foundation of Russian great power status in the late 19th and into the 20th century. And for all those reasons, Russia wanted to maintain its preeminent influence in Ukraine even after the breakup of the Soviet Union. The growing presence of Western powers inside Ukraine, not so much on the economic side but on the military and security side, that grew in the 2010s, Russian leaders treated with tremendous alarm. And so they were doing what they could to prevent Ukraine's drift into the Western orbit. After the revolution of dignity, the Maidan revolution in 2014, when Russia was deeply concerned about Ukraine's geopolitical orientation, Putin decides to seize Crimea as a way of putting a stop on that foment rebellion in Eastern Ukraine for that same purpose. And it's the increasingly close ties between Ukraine and the West, particularly between Ukraine and individual members of NATO, that provides the backdrop for Putin's decision to go to war in February 2022. So there's a long history to this. Russia feels very strongly about maintaining its presence in Ukraine. None of what I said justifies Russia's aggression against Ukraine, but I think it helps you understand how we got to this point. Yeah, if we talk about the Maidan revolution in 2014, there's a lot of rumors going on about the influence of, as you mentioned, certain individual NATO members and the US. So how strong do you think were those influences and how strong did they affect the Maidan revolution at that time? Well, I think the first point is that the Maidan revolution has largely consequences of internal factors. This is something that Ukrainians did for their own purposes. Was the United States or other Western countries supportive of those forces that wanted to deal with corruption, wanted to see a much more open political system, wanted to align their country further with the West, wanted to bring it into closer association with the European Union? I think the short answer is yes. And so there was certainly a great deal of moral support in the West for what was happening inside Ukraine at that time. You know, there may have been some assistance through NGOs, for example, but I think the fundamental point is that the revolution was a Ukrainian making for Ukrainian purposes. It's not a Western plot against Russia. If we talk further about the Russian development in the 2000s from 2000 to today, we certainly can see a development from cooperation with the West towards cooperation with Asia and China, for example. Did you think that was a result of failed cooperation with the West? I mean, the decision to turn to the East or pivot to the East in a significant way does grow out of disappointment, Moscow, the quality of the kind of cooperation with the West, the widespread view inside the Kremlin, and particularly Putin's view that the West was taking advantage of Russia, was not paying attention to its national interest, was trying to undermine or contain Russia, and indeed even trying to engineer a changing regime inside Russia, led to the decision that we needed to break with the West in a significant way and pivot to Asia, particularly to China, as a foundation of our foreign policy, as a foundation of Russia's role in the world going forward. So, after we see this change towards Asia, towards the East, do you think that certainly influenced the development in Europe and the US towards Russia? So, if we look at the period of cooperation, and the period without cooperation or with less cooperation, do you think that affected people in the US and Europe too? Well, there was certainly growing disappointment with developments in Russia on the part of European leaders and American leaders. We were concerned about the growing authoritarian tendencies inside Russia. We were concerned about what we saw as a much more aggressive foreign policy, remember that Russia does engage in a short war with Georgia in 2008, the seizure of Crimea in 2014, the first time since the end of the Second World War, that a country had seized a territory from another state. So, all those things were of concern to European leaders and American leaders. Talking about Crimea, about the seizure of Crimea, do you think it was just a pure annexation of this island or half island in Eastern Ukraine, or is there a part of the native or indigenous people who want to belong to Russia? Well, you know, it's hard to say. I mean, a large share of the population of Crimea is ethnic Russian. Many of them are former Soviet military officers serving Russian military officers. If you had held a free and fair referendum in Crimea in 2014, you can't rule out the possibility that a significant majority would have voted to become part of the Russian Federation and leave Ukraine. I think polling that has been done in Crimea since 2014 continues to show significant support for being part of Russia. So, I think that is a sort of political reality in all that sense. Crimea still was part of Ukraine. It was recognized as part of Ukraine after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Russia had signed a treaty with Ukraine in 1997 that recognized the borders existing at that point. So, no matter what the views of the local population, Russia did use military force to seize that territory in 2014. So, what did you think was the reaction of the U.S., and particularly Europe, not so strong towards the seizure of Crimea in 2014? And what, for example, were the attacks in 2022? Well, again, the situation in the world was different and there were still hopes of cooperation. If you look at this from the U.S. standpoint, we still wanted to cooperate with Russia and Syria in dealing with the Islamic State. We were concerned about Iran's nuclear program. We wanted to continue to work with the Russians in trying to contain that program. The Iranian nuclear deal, for example, occurs in 2015, a little over a year after the Russians had seized Crimea. So, there were things that we wanted to do with the Russians that I think dampened the reaction against what Russia had done in Crimea. The second part is that I do believe that many people looked at the situation in Crimea and rightfully or wrongly concluded that if there had been a free and fair referendum, that the Crimeans would have voted to become part of Russia. So, nobody was really prepared to go to war against Russia to overturn this result. There are still things that we wanted to do with Russia. Europe was still highly dependent on Russian gas at that point. I think that is the reason you saw the less than forceful response to Russia's annexation of Crimea. So, you could conclude that it was pure economic pragmatism of the West not to really intervene in this conflict at that time. Well, there was economic pragmatism. There was also, as I said, geopolitical issues as well that factored into the decision to not be as forceful in condemning or sort of punishing Russia for what it did in Crimea. After those events in 2014 particularly, so, after the events of 2014 in particular, how did you think did that affect the European security structure in comparison to before? And the strategy the European Union, for example, did pursue for their security? Well, you know, up to 2014, I think the West looked at the European security as largely a cooperative relationship with the Russians. After 2014, after the seizure of Crimea, it is no longer a cooperative relationship, although France and Germany do try to work with Ukraine and Russia in the implementation of so-called Minsk Agreements, which were intended to lead to a resolution of the conflict in Eastern Ukraine at that point. But the NATO-Russia Council suspends its activities after Russia's annexation of Crimea. Russia is expelled from the G7 at that point, so it's no longer expelled from the G8, so the G8 becomes the G7 again. And there are certain limited sanctions and a clear weakening or attenuation of the diplomatic contacts between Russia and the West at that point. So, if we talk about being expelled of the G8 and being, and the NATO Council being, I mean, just its success being, or its failure of the NATO Council at that point, would you agree with the argumentation of some Russian policymakers who say that the West pushed Russia towards the East at this point, if you don't want any cooperation anymore? Well, again, I think that's an exaggeration. I mean, Russia had been improving its relationship with China since the very last years of the Soviet period. It had grown through the 2000s and the 2010s. You know, clearly it accelerated after 2014, in part because Russia had few opportunities with Europe and the United States at that point. But the Western reaction to Russian measures in 2014 is not the reason for Russia's turn to the East. They were moving in that direction for their own purposes even before 2014. What do you think are those reasons for the moving towards the East? Is it just economic reasons or is it more of a cooperation in between authoritarian governments, which leads to a cooperation? Well, I remember that when this started, I guess it was the late Gorbachev period, but it grows throughout the 1990s, that people didn't think of it as cooperation between authoritarian states at this point. I think the underlying reasons were, one, economic, as you've already mentioned, but also strategic or geopolitical, that China and Russia realized that the West had been playing, or the United States in particular, had been playing on differences between those two countries as a way of advancing its own interests by restoring political ties. Each of the countries believed that it gained certain leverage in its relationship with the United States. So it's a combination of geopolitical concerns and economic concerns that leads to an improvement in relations between Russia and China. That accelerates, as I've said, after 2014, in part because of the sharp deterioration in relations between Russia and the West and Russia needing a closer relationship with China to avoid diplomatic isolation, but also as a hedge against any turndown in economic ties with the West that may have resulted from the growing disapproval of Western activities, or excuse me, Russian activities in Western capitals. Do you think there is a goal in between Russia, or there's a collaborative goal of Russia and China to pursue in international politics today? Is it just this will to have a multipolar world where nobody is really dependent on one big player like the US, for example, and more of a balanced international society? Do you think this is the goal of today's collaboration between Russia and China? Or is it just a more pragmatic situation that Russia doesn't want to be isolated today in global politics? Well, you know, there are a lot of different reasons. I think the fundamental one is that the two countries do want to push back against what they call the US global hegemony, a unipolar world to one that is less dominated by the United States, in which China and Russia have greater latitude for advancing their own geopolitical and economic interests. So if we come back to the Russian society, do you think the Russian society is really ready for change to a democracy in general? Is it possible to have a democracy on that territory where it has technically never really existed? Well, first of all, remember that democracy is a large modern development in any event. So it has grown up in many, many places that did not have experience with democracy before. It took place as a political system. That's true of Western Europe. That's true of almost any other place where democracy has grown up. So the fact that Russia hasn't had a deep democratic tradition is not a fundamental black against that type of society emerging sometime in the future. You know, all that said, I think if you look at the structure of Russian society, the attitudes of Russian people, their desires and so forth, that there is not good soil for the emergence of a Western-style democracy anytime in the near future. Polls inside Russia, assessments of a lead-up to suggest that the overwhelming majority of Russians is not interested in the emergence of a Western-style democratic system in their own country. What do you think could be one of the solutions to make, don't take action but just theoretically, to have a more open and a more progressive society within Russia with, for example, freedom of speech or freedom of expression? What do you think would be solutions to this problem? Well, but look, I mean, that is something for the Russians themselves to decide. They are the ones that determine the structure of their own political system. There is very little that outside forces can do to shape the views of Russians with regard to their political structure and so forth. You know, one of the few things that European countries can do and the United States can do is demonstrate that their own democratic systems are capable of dealing with the challenges of the 21st century, socioeconomic challenges, the political challenges and so forth, and provide models of success that other countries might want to emulate, starting with Russia. That, in fact, is one of the reasons for the opening up of the Soviet system in the 1980s. But the West hardly looks like a model worth emulating at this point given the very sharp divisions and polarization within many Western countries at this point and the widespread, I think, view, even in the countries themselves, that the political system is not dealing adequately with the challenges that the countries are facing. Yeah. So, at the end, I would like to ask for a little bit of an insight. What do you enjoy the most every time you go to Russia or when you've been the last time there? What is one thing that really contributes to your fascination of this territory or area? It's the people. It's the people that you get to meet, the people you get to talk to, and simply being able to share views on the big issues of global affairs, historical development, and so forth, makes a worthwhile and very fascinating experience. So, first of all, thank you, Thomas, for this little insight and taking the time to speak on the podcast. I really hope the best for Russia and Russian people and Russian society in the future. And I hope for better cooperation in between the West in particular and, I mean, Ukraine anyway, with Russia. I hope you enjoyed your time. I certainly did. Good luck. Thanks.